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1. Introduction
Imagine that you open your morning newspaper and read the following report:
Brownsville, AR. A local object partially immersed in a liquid was buoyed
upward Tuesday by a force equal to the weight of the liquid displaced by that object,
witnesses at the scene reported. As of press time, the object is still maintaining
positive buoyancy.
In fact, I did read this report in the ONION; I have only abridged it to add a
Fe´ne´onian touch.
If this meeting had been dedicated to the nature of the comical, one could pro-
duce an interesting analysis of the clever silliness of this parody. But as we are
preoccupied with truth, I will use it in order to illustrate the differences between
the attitudes to truth among practitioners of social sciences and law (as exemplified
by [BoHa]) on the one hand, and that of, say, physicists, on the other.
To put it crudely, in social sciences information comes from witnesses; but in
what sense was Archimedes’ role in his discovery that of a witness, and are the
experimental observations generating/supporting a physical theory on an equal
footing with the observations of witnesses to a crime scene, or respondents to a
poll?
Now, imagine another report, that could have been posted on the web–site of
the Department of Physics of Cambridge University:
The Cavendish Laboratory News & Features bulletin announced yesterday that a
Cavendish student has won Science, Engineering and Technology award. He man-
aged to measure the constant pi with unprecedented precision: pi = 3, 1415925... with
an error ±2 at the last digit.
1Talk at the International Symposium of the Balzan Foundation “Truth in the Humanities,
Science and Religion”, Lugano, May 16–17, 2008.
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2I must confess right away that I did not read but simply fabricated this spoof
in order to stress the further differences between the attitudes towards truth, now
held by physicists and by mathematicians respectively.
On the one hand, formally such an announcement would make perfect sense: the
mathematical constant pi can be measured with some precision, in the same way
that any physical constant such as the speed of light c, or the mass of the electron
can be measured. The maximum achievable precision, at least of a “naive” direct
measurement of pi, is determined by the degree to which we can approximate ideal
Euclidean rigid bodies by real physical ones. The limits to this approximation are
set by the atomic structure of matter, and in the final analysis, by quantum effects.
On the other hand, in order to get in principle as many digits of pi as one
wishes, measurements are not required at all. Instead, one can use one of the many
existing formulas/algorithms/software codes and do it on a sheet of paper, a pocket
calculator, or a supercomputer. This time the limits of precision are determined by
the physical limitations of our calculator: the size of the sheet of paper, memory of
computer, construction of the output device, available time ...
What I want to stress now is that pi imagined as an infinite sequence of its digits,
is not amenable to a “finite” calculation: even the number of digits of pi equal to the
number of atoms in the observable Universe, would not exhaust pi. Nevertheless,
mathematicians speak about pi and work with pi as if it were a completely well
defined entity, graspable in its entirety not only by one exceptional super–Mind,
but by the minds of all trained researchers, never doubting that when they speak
of pi, they speak about one and the same ideal object, as rigid as if it really exists
in some Platonic world.
In fact, one facet of this rigidity can be expressed by a few theorems implying
that whatever exact formula, algorithm, or software code we might use to calculate
pi and whatever precision we choose, we will always get the same result. If we do
not, either our formula was wrong, or the calculator made a mistake/there was a
bug in the code/output device could not cope with the quantity of information ...
Contemplating this example, we may grasp the meaning of the succinct descrip-
tion of mathematics by Davis and Hersh ([DaHe]): “the study of mental objects
with reproducible properties”.
However, I want to use this example in order to stress that most of the deep
mathematical truths are about infinity and infinitary mental constructs rather than
experimentally verifiable finitary – and finite – operations, that can be modeled
using actual objects of the physical world.
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... mais je ne le crois pas!
G. Cantor to R. Dedekind, June 29, 1877
Before Georg Cantor, infinity appeared in mathematical theorems mostly im-
plicitly, through the quantifier “all” (which also could be only implicit as in most
Euclid’s theorems).
Cantor proved the first theorem ever in which infinities themselves were objects
of consideration. Slightly modernizing his arguments, we can say that he invented
two or three mental constructions allowing us to compare sizes (technically, cardi-
nalities) of infinite (in fact, finite as well) sets:
a) Two sets X , Y have equal cardinalities, symbolically |X | = |Y |, if their
elements x ∈ X , y ∈ Y can be joined in pairs (x, y) in such a way that each x is
paired with exactly one y and each y with exactly one x.
b) The cardinality ofX is called “less or equal” to that Y , symbolically |X | ≤ |Y |,
if there is a subset X ′ ⊂ Y such that |X | = |X ′|.
After these two definitions, the famous Cantor’s theorem can be proved in several
lines:
c) The set of all subsets of X , symbolically P (X), has cardinality strictly larger
than that of X .
Since we may iterate this construction, forming consecutively P (P (X)), P (P (P (X))),
. . . , we see that there exists an infinite scale of infinities of growing sizes.
The proof of c) consists of two remarks. The first one says that |X | ≤ |P (X)|,
because X can be in a tautological way paired with a part of P (X) consisting of
one–element subsets of X .
The second remark is (a remake of) the famous Cantor’s diagonal argument,
using reductio ad absurdum. Imagine that |X | = |P (X)|. Then we can pair each
x ∈ X with some Sx ⊂ X in such a way that any subset S ⊂ X has the form Sy
for some y ∈ S. Choose such a pairing (technically, one–to–one correspondence).
Define
S = the set of all x such that x /∈ Sx.
This S must be of the form Sy for some y ∈ X , but then both logical possibilities,
y /∈ Sy and y ∈ Sy lead to a contradiction, so that the postulated one–to–one
correspondence cannot exist.
4Of course, the last key argument goes back to the ancient “liar’s paradox”. It
was revived again in a different context in the 20th century by Tarski and Go¨del.
Tarski’s theorem features the ominous, at least for the purposes of this conference,
name “inexpressibility of truth”.
In the final analysis, self–referentiality was used to produce several deep mathe-
matical arguments, and this became possible only when the mathematical universe
became so extended that the language of mathematics could be embedded into this
universe as a part of it. In particular, Leibniz’s dream of merging language with
meta–language became a reality.
3
The best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr (1919)
When Cantor first presented his diagonal argument in a letter to Dedekind in
1873, it was worded differently and used only to prove that the cardinality of the
natural numbers is strictly less than that of the real numbers. The discovery of
the proof itself was in a sense hardly more important than the discovery of the
definition of what it means, for one infinity to be larger than another one.
As soon as this was achieved, Cantor started thinking about the cardinality of
the reals compared with that of the pairs of reals, or, geometrically, sets of points
of a curve and of a surface respectively. They turned out to be equal! If we have a
pair of numbers (α, β) in (0, 1), Cantor suggested to produce from them the third
number γ ∈ (0, 1) by putting decimal digits of α to the odd places, and those of
β to the even places. One sees, that vice versa, (α, β) can be reconstructed from
γ. Dedekind, who was informed by Cantor’s letter about this discovery as well,
remarked that this does not quite work because some rational numbers have two
decimal representations, such as 0, 499999 · · · = 0, 5000000 . . . . Cantor had to spend
some time to amend the proof, but this was a minor embarrassment, in comparison
with the fascinating novelty of the fact itself: “Ce que je vous ai communique´ tout
re´cemment est pour moi si inattendue, si nouveau, que je ne pourrai pour ainsi dire
pas arriver a` une certaine tranquillite´ d’esprit avant que je n’aie rec¸u, tre`s honore´
ami, votre jugement sur son exactitude. Tant que vous ne m’aurez pas approuve´,
je ne puis que dire: je le vois, mais je ne le crois pas”, as Cantor famously wrote
to Dedekind.
This returns us to the basic question on the nature of truth.
5We are reminded that the notion of “truth” is a reification of a certain rela-
tionship between humans and texts/utterances/statements, the relationship that is
called “belief”, “conviction” or “faith”, and which itself should be analyzed, to-
gether with other primary notions invoked in this definition.
Professor Blackburn in [Bl] extensively discussed other relationships of humans
to texts, such as scepticism, conservatism, relativism, deflationism. However, in the
long range all of them are secondary in the practice of a researcher in mathematics.
So I will return to truth.
I will skip analysis of the notion of “humans” :=) and will only sketch what must
be said about texts, sources of conviction, and methods of conviction peculiar to
mathematics.
Texts. Alfred North Whitehead allegedly said that all of Western philosophy was
but a footnote to Plato.
The underlying metaphor of such a statement is: “Philosophy is a text”, the
sum total of all philosophic utterances.
Mathematics decidedly is not a text, at least not in the same sense as philosophy.
There are no authoritative books or articles to which subsequent generations turn
again and again for wisdom. Except for historians, nobody reads Euclid, Newton,
Leibniz or Hilbert in order to study geometry, calculus or mathematical logic. The
life span of any mathematical paper or book can be years, in the best (and excep-
tional) case decades. Mathematical wisdom, if not forgotten, lives as an invariant
of all its (re)presentations in a permanently self–renewing discourse.
Sources and methods of conviction. Mathematical truth is not revealed, and its
acceptance is not imposed by any authority.
Moreover, mathematical truth decidedly is not something that can be ascer-
tained, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes put it, by “the majority vote of the
nation that could lick all the others” (quoted from [Pe]), or by acceptance “in the
competition of the market”. In short, it is not a democratic value.
Ideally, the truth of a mathematical statement is ensured by a proof, and the ideal
picture of a proof is a sequence of elementary arguments whose rules of formation
are explicitly laid down before the proof even begins, and ideally are common for all
proofs that have been devised and can be devised in future. The admissible starting
points of proofs, “axioms”, and terms in which they are formulated, should also be
discussed and made explicit.
This ideal picture is so rigid that it can itself become the subject of mathematical
study, which was actually performed and led to several remarkable discoveries,
6technically all related to the effects of merging language with metalanguage and
self–referentiality.
Of course, the real life proofs are rendered in a peculiar mixture of a natural
language, formulas, motivations, examples. They are much more condensed than
imaginary formal proofs. The ways of condensing them are not systematic in any
way. We are prone to mistakes, to taking on trust others’ results that can be
mistaken as well, and to relying upon authority and revelations from our teachers.
(All of this should have been discussed together with the notion of “humans” which
I have wisely avoided.)
Moreover, the discovery of truth may, and usually does, involve experimentation,
nowadays vast and computer–assisted, false steps, sudden insights and all that
which makes mathematical creativity so fascinating for its adepts.
One metaphor of proof is a route, which might be a desert track boring and
unimpressive until one finally reaches the oasis of one’s destination, or a foot path
in green hills, exciting and energizing, opening great vistas of unexplored lands and
seductive offshoots, leading far away even after the initial destination point has
been reached.
4
[...] “mismanagement and grief”: here you have that
enormous distance between cause and effect covered in one line.
Just as math preaches how to do it.
J. Brodsky. On “September 1, 1939” by W. H. Auden.
Mathematics is most visible to the general public when it is posits itself as an
applied science, and in this role the notion of mathematical truth acquires distinctly
new features. For example, our initial discussion of pi as an essentialy non–finitary
(“irrational”) real number becomes pointless; whenever pi enters any practical cal-
culation, the first few digits are all that matters.
In a wider context than just applied science, mathematics can be fruitfully con-
ceived as a toolkit containing powerful cognitive devices. I have argued elsewhere
([Ma1], [Ma2]) that these devices can be roughly divided into three overlapping
domains: models, theories, and metaphors. Quoting from [Ma2],
“A mathematical model describes a certain range of phenomena qualitatively or
quantitatively but feels uneasy pretending to be something more.
7From Ptolemy’s epicycles (describing planetary motions, ca 150) to the Stan-
dard Model (describing interactions of elementary particles, ca 1960), quantitative
models cling to the observable reality by adjusting numerical values of sometimes
dozens of free parameters (≥ 20 for the Standard Model). Such models can be
remarkably precise.
Qualitative models offer insights into stability/instability, attractors which are
limiting states tending to occur independently of initial conditions, critical phe-
nomena in complex systems which happen when the system crosses a boundary
between two phase states, or two basins of different attractors. [...]
What distinguishes a (mathematically formulated physical) theory from a model
is primarily its higher aspirations. A modern physical theory generally purports
that it would describe the world with absolute precision if only it (the world)
consisted of some restricted variety of stuff: massive point particles obeying only
the law of gravity; electromagnetic field in a vacuum; and the like. [...]
A recurrent driving force generating theories is a concept of a reality beyond and
above the material world, reality which may be grasped only by mathematical tools.
From Plato’s solids to Galileo’s “language of nature” to quantum superstrings, this
psychological attitude can be traced sometimes even if it conflicts with the explicit
philosophical positions of the researchers.
A (mathematical) metaphor, when it aspires to be a cognitive tool, postulates
that some complex range of phenomena might be compared to a mathematical
construction. The most recent mathematical metaphor I have in mind is Artificial
Intelligence (AI). On the one hand, AI is a body of knowledge related to computers
and a new, technologically created reality, consisting of hardware, software, Internet
etc. On the other hand, it is a potential model of functioning of biological brains
and minds. In its entirety, it has not reached the status of a model: we have
no systematic, coherent and extensive list of correspondences between chips and
neurons, computer algorithms and brain algorithms. But we can and do use our
extensive knowledge of algorithms and computers (because they were created by
us) to generate educated guesses about structure and function of the central neural
system [...].
A mathematical theory is an invitation to build applicable models. A mathe-
matical metaphor is an invitation to ponder upon what we know.”
As an aside, let us note that George Lakoff’s definition of poetic metaphors such
as “love is a journey” in [La] is itself expressed as a mathematical metaphor using the
characteristic Cantor–Bourbaki mental images and vocabulary: “More technically,
8the metaphor can be understood as a mapping (in the mathematical sense) from a
source domain (in this case, journeys) to a target domain (in this case, love). The
mapping is tightly structured. There are ontological correspondences, according to
which entities in the domain of love (e. g. the lovers, their common goals, their
difficulties, the love relationship, etc.) correspond systematically to entities in the
domain of a journey (the travellers, the vehicle, destinations, etc.).”
When a mathematical construction is used as a cognitive tool, the discussion of
truth becomes loaded with new meanings: a model, a theory or a metaphor must be
true to a certain reality, more tangible and real than the Platonic “reality” of pure
mathematics. In fact, philosophers of science routinely discussed truth precisely in
this context. Karl Popper’s vision of scientific theories in terms of falsifiability (vs
verifiability) is quite appropriate in the context of highly mathematicised theories
as well.
What I want to stress here, however, is one aspect of contemporary mathematical
models which is historically very recent. Namely, models are more and more widely
used as “black boxes” with hidden computerized input procedures, and oracular
outputs prescribing behavior of human users.
Mary Poovey, discussing from this viewpoint financial markets, remarks in her
insightful essay [Po] that what she calls “representations”, basically computerized
bookkeeping or the numbers a trader enters in a computer, tend to replace the actual
exchange of cash or commodities. “This conflation of representation and exchange
has all kinds of material effects, [...] for when representation can influence or take
the place of exchanges, the values at stake become notional too: they can grow
exponentially or collapse at the stroke of key”.
In fact, actions of traders, banks, hedge funds and alike are to a considerable
degree determined by the statistical models of financial markets encoded in the
software of their computers. These models thus become a hidden and highly in-
fluential part of the actions, our computerized “collective unconscious”. As such,
they cannot even be judged according to the usual criteria of choosing models which
better reflect the behavior of a process being modeled. They are part of any such
process.
What becomes more essential than their empirical adequacy, is, for example,
their stabilizing or destabilizing potential. Risk management assuming mild vari-
ability and small risks can collapse when a disaster occurs, ruining many partici-
pants of the game; risk management based upon models that use pessimistic “Le´vy
distributions” rather than omnipresent Gaussians paradoxically tends to flatten the
shock waves and thus to avoid major disasters (cf. [MandHu]).
95
There have been dramatic changes in the way in which
the motion of the crowd is modeled in recent years.
R. Clemens, R. Hughes, in [ClHu].
When in the 20th century mathematicians got involved in heated discussions
about the so called “Crisis in Foundations of Mathematics”, several issues were
intermingled.
Philosophically–minded logicians and professional philosophers were engaged
with the nature and accessibility of mathematical truth (and reliability of our men-
tal tools used in the process of acquiring it).
Logicists (finitists, formalists, intuitionists) were elaborating severe normative
prescriptions trying to outlaw dangerous mental experiments with infinity, non–
constructivity and reductio ad absurdum.
For a working mathematician, when he/she is concerned at all, “foundations”
is simply a general term for the historically variable set of rules and principles of
organization of the body of mathematical knowledge, both existing and being cre-
ated. From this viewpoint, the most influential foundational achievement in the
20th century was an ambitious project of the Bourbaki group, building all math-
ematics, including logic, around set–theoretical “structures” and making Cantor’s
language of sets a common vernacular of algebraists, geometers, probabilists and all
other practitioners of our trade. These days, this vernacular, with all its vocabulary
and ingrained mental habits, is being slowly replaced by the languages of category
theory and homotopy theory and their higher extensions. Respectively, the basic
“left–brain” intuition of sets, composed of distinguishable elements, is giving way
to a new, more “right brain” basic intuition dealing with space–like and continuous
primary images, both deformable and deforming.
In the Western ethnomathematics, truth is best understood as a central value,
ever to be pursued, rather than anything achieved. Practical efficiency, authority,
success in competition, faith, all other clashing values must recede in the mind of
a mathematician when he or she sets down to do their job.
The most interesting intracultural interactions of mathematics such as symbol-
ized by this conference are as well those that are not direct but rather proceed with
the mediation of value systems.
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Coda
Every four years, mathematicians from all over the world meet at the Interna-
tional Congresses (ICM), to discuss whatever interesting developments happened
recently in their domains of expertise. One of the traditions of these Congresses is
a series of lectures for general public.
In 1998, our Congress met in Berlin, and Hans Magnus Enzensberger, the
renowned poet and essayist, deeply interested in mathematics, spoke about “Zug-
bru¨cke außer Betrieb: die Mathematik im Jenseits der Kultur”: the drawbridge to
the castle of mathematics is out of service. The main concern of his talk was a
deplorable lack of mathematical culture and communication between the general
public and mathematicians, leading to alienation and mutual mistrust.
At the end of his talk ([Enz]) Enzensberger quotes an imaginary dialogue from
[St], where a mathematician is chatting with a fictitional layman “Seamus Android”.
“Mathematician: It’s one of the most important discoveries of the last decade!
Android: Can you explain it in words ordinary mortals can understand?
Mathematician: Look, buster, if ordinary mortals could understand it, you
wouldn’t need mathematicians to do the job for you, right? You can’t get a feeling
for what’s going on without understanding the technical details. How can I talk
about manifolds without mentioning that the theorems only work if the manifolds
are finite–dimensional para–compact Hausdorff with empty boundary?
Android: Lie a bit.
Mathematician: Oh, but I couldn’t do that!
Android: Why not? Everybody else does.”
And here I must play God and say to both Android and Mathematician: “Oh,
no! Don’t lie — because everybody else does.”
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